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Grand theft water: the calculus of compliance 1 
Water crises are amongst the biggest challenges facing humanity. Uncertain future supply, and 2 
growing demand, may lead to higher incidences of theft particularly by agricultural users who 3 
account for approximately 70% of global water use. However, research into water theft is 4 
underexplored in all disciplines. This paper provides a new conceptual framework designed to 5 
improve understanding of both individual and institutional barriers to water theft. The 6 
framework explores how effective detection, prosecution, conviction and penalties could be 7 
assessed. Three case studies are used to test the validity of our framework. Our findings suggest 8 
that while individuals and companies may be responsible for the act of theft, the phenomenon 9 
reflects a systematic failure of arrangements (political, legal, institutional, etc.). Additionally, 10 
when regulators fail to understand the value of water, inadequate penalties increase the risk of 11 
theft. Consistent with a view modelling approaches may offer adequate methods for analysis and 12 
insight, we invite others to test our framework and engage in a wider conversation about water 13 
theft. 14 
It is estimated that between 30-50% of global water supply 1 is stolen. Although the legal/illegal nature 15 
of water appropriation may not always be clear-cut 2, a better understanding of legal rights to water and 16 
the motivations for individuals to circumvent those rights during times of acute scarcity is timely. On-17 
going water shortages occur on all continents, increasingly compounded by climate change. By 18 
addressing likely drivers of theft at an individual scale, we may prevent irreversible harm to other water 19 
users. Theories about the drivers of theft suggest that people: i) deviate from social norms due to a 20 
psychological predisposition toward rule-breaking (psychological theory of compliance) or differences 21 
in personal moral development (cognitive theory of compliance ) 3; ii) have their decisions conditioned 22 
by interactions with their environment (social learning theory) 4; iii) have divergent perceptions of the 23 
legitimacy and fairness of rules (sociological normative theories) 5, and/or iv) are more likely to be non-24 
compliant when the benefits outweigh the costs (economic instrumental theory) 6. All of these factors, 25 
and their interaction within designed contexts (i.e. legal, political, economic, social and cultural 26 
institutions) are important for understanding why individuals and entities may engage in illegal activity. 27 
In the case of water specifically, we argue that dynamic change and periodic uncertainty over water 28 
supply/demand pressures also influence illegal behavior, where gradual or sudden changes in supply 29 
occur (i.e. hydrological, climatological, environmental, landscape or biophysical circumstances). 30 
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Changes to water supply (e.g. drought periods) may also alter individual/entity perceptions of norms, 31 
legitimacy and fairness, and the relative benefits/costs of decision-making., Scarcity increases the 32 
probability of water theft where opportunities for detection are reduced due water’s different spatial and 33 
temporal scales of use within urban, industrial or agricultural networks, its physical mobility, and its 34 
non-excludability. As incentives to steal water increase, so does the challenge for regulators with respect 35 
to resourcing, detection, enforcement and appropriate sanctions. For example, in Taiwan upstream 36 
farmers often stole water even when they didn’t need it, as the spatial distribution of users meant theft 37 
went largely undetected 7. Large numbers of water-users in irrigation-supply systems may also reduce 38 
detection probability, and increase theft activity 8. Similar results are observed for Australian water 39 
resources where theft may be compounded by perceptions of general non-compliance among users 9; 40 
although inverse results have been reported in European jurisdictions 10. By contrast, in a South Indian 41 
case 11 theft was more commonly perpetrated by downstream users desperate for supply. Different 42 
management systems to control illegal extraction were employed at top and tail areas, with positive 43 
results. Theft was also minimized in Andean irrigation systems via shared social objectives, widespread 44 
assumption of high compliance rates, and effective monitoring 12. Further, where groundwater resources 45 
can substitute surface water, understanding their shared connectivity may minimize tipping points from 46 
changes in use. 13Cultural values may play a role in changing social norms toward compliance and the 47 
deterrence of rule-breaking 14,15 especially where individual accountability is ignored and regulatory 48 
controls do not mitigate resource exploitation 16. Finally, if the probability of successful prosecution is 49 
low, and the penalty comparatively small, stronger deterrents may be needed to dissuade users from 50 
stealing water to maximize profits 17 and/or lowering total resource sustainability. 51 
However, robust theory capable of encompassing these diverse drivers, together with validation models 52 
to inform optimal compliance measures, is missing from the sustainability literature 18. We propose a 53 
conceptual framework, based on the theoretical and dynamic drivers outlined above, and offer it up for 54 
testing and validation. The basis of the framework is a compliance cost calculus, where Laffont 19, pg. 529 55 
describes the second instrument for addressing incentives to collude (steal) as “mechanisms which limit 56 
rents captured by agents or firms based on profit reducing or cost performance worsening outcomes”. 57 
Intuitively, non-compliance costs equate to the penalty imposed multiplied by the product of detection, 58 
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prosecution and conviction probabilities—where higher probabilities equate to lower non-compliance 59 
costs for society. Thus, while some studies suggest higher penalties may diminish cooperation 20, we 60 
argue that they are needed in water contexts to set critical value perceptions and social norms. The 61 
probabilities will be set by theoretical individual and dynamic change drivers of illegal activity. These 62 
themselves interact with i) designed contexts via regulatory capture wherein individuals or groups may 63 
alter these institutions for personal gain or to reduce opportunities for capture, and ii) natural contexts 64 
where shocks may increase incentives to steal, and where better understanding of state of nature 65 
outcomes over time may improve our designed context and adaptation responses to change (as indicated 66 
by the arrow on the RHS in Figure 1). The process by which this is framework links to the calculus 67 
process is detailed in the Methods section. 68 
 69 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework for calculating compliance costs and institutional investment needs 70 
Ultimately, an improved consideration of these factors may allow us to calculate the value of penalties, 71 
including pecuniary/altruist punishments, and investments in detection/prosecution/conviction systems 72 
to avoid losses, address dynamic change and lower incidents of theft. Calculating the compliance cost 73 
for water resources is critical due to multiple equilibria that can rapidly emerge within supply/demand 74 
systems 21. Sanctions based on normal supply states and mean variance biases (i.e. high probability of 75 
occurrence, and thus most experienced by regulators and firms alike) may underestimate the potential 76 
profits and/or costs avoided during dry periods (i.e. high probability of inducing water theft outcomes), 77 
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where the highest public cost/private benefit gains will occur. Disparities may worsen under climate 78 
change and reduce the total financial base for effective monitoring or detection. However, little attention 79 
is paid to the financial base of regulatory settings, potentially resulting in compliance and monitoring 80 
arrangements that are sub-optimal 19. To the extent that both adequate water delivery infrastructure and 81 
monitoring and enforcement of water regulation may also be dependent on user fees, water theft can 82 
have a multiple and cascading negative effect 13,14, further undermining enforcement. It is therefore 83 
useful to carefully consider the design and implementation of detection and sanction arrangements in 84 
water systems within the broader context of individual and institutional incentives to steal. In many 85 
contexts’ legislation has not been updated to effectively regulate agricultural extraction and ensure 86 
sustainable resource use, while inadequate legislative frameworks may provide legal extraction 87 
opportunities that impact on other users (e.g. environmental flows). In the interests of informing 88 
countries about these issues, we test our framework (see the Methods section at the end of this paper) 89 
to identify regulatory options. 90 
Case Study Insights 91 
The cases involve marijuana cropping in California, strawberry cultivation in Spain and cotton growing 92 
in Australia, where at the end of each case we have highlighted the relevant examples of theoretical and 93 
dynamic theft drivers. Environmental flows and groundwater stocks represent the commonly impacted 94 
user in each of the case studies, which in more general terms triangulates well with previous research. 95 
The cases also collectively involve individuals that express concerns about the legitimacy of water 96 
extraction rules that favour environmental uses over consumptive (e.g. in Australia where some cotton 97 
growers did not view the environment as a legitimate user), and examples of authorities questioning the 98 
fairness of prosecuting users for theft when those same rules may be ambiguous, and the ‘crime’ viewed 99 
as less serious than other offences (e.g. contrasts between Federal and California laws, and their 100 
enforcement, in the US). In some respects, compliance by agricultural users operators is generally 101 
viewed as a burden 22, leading to perceived differences between compliant and non-compliant users. 102 
These differences may then decrease over time, as users come to view theft as a social norm and 103 
morality differences begin to wane (e.g. increasing illegal activity by irrigators in the Doñana, leading 104 
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to eventual violence against authorities). Efforts to address violent behavior with amnesty arrangements 105 
only legitimizes illegal actions in our view, with significant later costs borne by those users with the 106 
lowest rights (e.g. environmental or groundwater users). However, the Australian case demonstrates 107 
that theft exposure may change social norms toward the better. It also shows that a change in both 108 
individual and institutional incentives is possible where the three probabilities/weights associated with 109 
detection/prosecution/conviction are increased. This is evidenced by public calls in Australia for 110 
improved institutions and personal behavior (e.g. in the Barwon-Darling where civil society 111 
organizations sought to enforce the law for environmental users).  112 
Similar observations about the relevance of dynamic drivers of theft, and their potential impact on the 113 
compliance calculation, particularly with respect to the setting of penalty levels, are also apparent in the 114 
case studies. Consistent with the theory of deterrence and incentive compatibility in mechanism design, 115 
if the penalty plus other costs of use approximate the value of water during normal supply conditions, 116 
then an effective deterrent against illegal extraction may occur (Figure 2). 117 
 118 
(a) ‘Normal’ market (b) Dry period market (c) Sanction level per ML 119 
Figure 2: Fixed penalties versus dynamic market pricing of water 120 
However, during water scarcity or limits on extraction substitutes such as groundwater, that same $/ML 121 
(megalitre—or one million litres) sanction would leave theft penalties far below the opportunity cost of 122 
water; particularly the short-run choke price (SRChoke) that some water users may be willing to pay to 123 
secure critical supply. Eventually, users may be forced down to a long-run choke price (LRChoke) due to 124 
finance limitations or other constraints—although that will still be above the market price (MKPrice). 125 
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6 
still be lower than the SRChoke price, providing no effective deterrent. In the setting of penalties note 127 
also the cumulative effect of low probabilities for detection 23 and enforcement/prosecution of illegal 128 
extraction, which some producers will compute, leading to perceptions of ineffective institutions. 129 
Building on Becker’s 6 work, if we formulate the real cost of a sanction Probδ as: 130 
Probδ = Fine * [ProbDetection * ProbProsecution * ProbConviction] 131 
where Fine is the dollar-value per ML sanction associated with illegal extraction, ProbDetection is the 132 
likelihood of being formally/informally detected while pumping illegally, ProbProsecution is the likelihood 133 
of the case being enforced or prosecuted, and ProbConviction is the likelihood of the producer being 134 
convicted, then we can clearly identify a relative weakness in the calculus. For example, the prosecution 135 
probability may be relatively high (e.g. 0.70), together with the likelihood of conviction (e.g. 0.60). 136 
However, if the likelihood of detection in the first instance is very low (e.g. 0.09 where governance 137 
failures mean that the distance between producers and regulators is large and compliance monitoring 138 
resources are extremely limited), then the real sanction cost (excluding legal or other transaction costs) 139 
could follow the example below (as calculated by the model outlined in the Methods section): 140 
Total Penalty = AU$3000/ML * [0.09 * 0.70 * 0.60] 141 
Total Sanction Cost = AU$113.40/ML 142 
In Australia, for example, an AU$113.40/ML real cost is akin to the market price of water during normal 143 
supply periods (i.e. non-scarcity). Further, if a producer applies any discount rate (Probδ/(1+r)t) to their 144 
decision-making—an area of sustainability research deserving more attention 18—then the real sanction 145 
cost over the lifetime of their farm investment may effectively reduce to a zero value and increase the 146 
incentive to act illegally. Finally, we must also consider time-lag effects which may impact on decision-147 
making when prosecution could take years to achieve. Under that arrangement, if the opportunity to act 148 
illegally continues (especially under ambiguous legislative arrangements), then the perpetrator will 149 
continue to profit economically, further diminishing the effect of sanctions 17. Arguably, water 150 
regulators have little capacity to meaningfully affect exogenous conviction probabilities. However, an 151 
obvious way to decrease water theft in the example above is to alter the calculus of sanction design by 152 
increasing the probability of effective detection (ProbDetection) and enforcement/prosecution 153 
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(ProbProsecution); both of which are usually needed to maintain cooperative efforts 24. This could be 154 
achieved by real-time telemetric metering of water extraction, and/or more frequent site inspections by 155 
authorities. Telemetry is cost-effective in remote and unregulated systems, reducing the need for 156 
resource-intensive inspections. New, widely implemented, detection systems may help identify in real 157 
time that water theft is occurring. This, coupled with public disclosure of usage data, may increase 158 
community confidence in enforcement of, and compliance with, water laws. While the installation and 159 
maintenance of meters can be expensive, total social welfare gains from introducing telemetry in high-160 
risk areas would also be high. Another option is to use remote sensing and satellite imagery to monitor 161 
(illegal) extraction as discussed in the Australian case. Combined with other forms of evidence (such 162 
as seasonal yield, hydrographic and/or metering data), these technologies can assist agencies to meet 163 
the criminal burden of proof, which may in turn have a deterrent probability-increasing effect. However, 164 
it may not eliminate the challenges of tracing culpability to a perpetrator. For effective satellite 165 
enforcement regulators must have: clear regulatory frameworks in support of their efforts; time and 166 
expertise to analyse season data and imagery across large areas; capacity to accurately discern the source 167 
of water identified and the actual perpetrator; and supporting information from other datasets to avoid 168 
false positives/negatives. 169 
Finally, users could be incentivized to monitor and report infringements to authorities under a changed 170 
set of cultural attitudes and revised social norms 13, that may need to include altruistic punishments such 171 
as a loss of access to supply. Group-enforced penalties may result in smaller resourcing of monitoring 172 
and enforcement, and create individual disincentives to steal water, by contrast with more formal 173 
arrangements. Water theft is not limited to large areas where detection is challenging. For example, 174 
Doñana region detection is feasible through collaborative WWF/river basin authority actions to monitor 175 
and report incidents. However, the true cost of theft is lower than the (economic) value of water due to 176 
low probabilities of prosecution and conviction. Very few cases are prosecuted and, of those, an even 177 
lower number results in a sanction. While 2000 cases of water theft have been reported since 2003 in 178 
the Doñana region, data from the district attorney’s office indicates a total of 28 guilty verdicts for water 179 
theft 25; a prosecution rate of 2.2% that clearly highlights the importance of effective deterrence. 180 
Apparent “solutions” to the problem of water theft, which include legalization of unlawful water 181 
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appropriations (e.g. Nestlé in California) or attempts to expand supply through infrastructure (e.g. farm 182 
water storages) suggest a production-centric institutional approach designed to mitigate impacts on the 183 
economy and protect violators. In many instances, this could arise from policy capture by agricultural 184 
producers or industry, which is more likely to reduce rather than increase compliance. Whatever the 185 
approach, we would argue that regulators must critically assess their sanction design calculus to identify 186 
weaknesses, within the context of all individual/entity and institutional incentives, and implement 187 
measures to improve detection and/or enforcement probabilities, as exampled in Figure 3. We are keen 188 
to see this argument modelled and tested in future studies.  189 
Increase the consequences for theft to promote sustainability 190 
In areas where environmental water is held by governments and released from storages to meet 191 
ecological objectives, some downstream users may legally or illegally extract this water. Where such 192 
extraction is legal, and will increase productivity in the short to medium term (with on-farm storage 193 
allowing for future use), there is little disincentive to refrain from pumping to meet public objectives 194 
associated with water uses. This may be particularly true during periods of relative water scarcity when 195 
releases of held environmental water may trigger the legal right to pump (e.g. if linked to flow levels 196 
recorded at relevant gauges). The case studies all illustrate the relevance of legislative arrangements to 197 
clarify the legal status of environmental flows, to simplify water use regulations, and to protect other 198 
rights from theft or abuse. 199 
For agricultural producers, theft decisions may simply weigh the value of lost production against the 200 
total penalty. High productivity values (e.g. marijuana crops in California) and/or irreversible capital 201 
loss (Option d, Figure 4 in Methods section) make water theft the rational option, and may form new 202 
social norms. Yet, theft typically results in losses to third-party users such as the prioritization of 203 
economic uses at the expense of environmental flows in the Doñana. In developed nation contexts, a 204 
high penalty setting with random monitoring schemes may provide appropriate disincentives to engage 205 
in undesirable and potentially damaging individualistic behavior, particularly where coupled with 206 
programs aimed at altering social norms and attitudes over time. 207 
9 
 208 
Figure 3: Matrix of conceptual framework outcomes among the three case studies 209 
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Ideally, that coupled penalty-setting/norm-changing approach will identify and communicate: i) gross 210 
benefits gained from illegal activity, ii) the harm and impact to third-parties from losing water rights, 211 
iii) and costs/value gained from effective detection, prosecution and conviction. 212 
For example, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) has proposed that three-213 
times multiple penalties may be sufficient to cover relevant costs of theft. Such a penalty baseline is 214 
appropriate for future arrangements where environmental losses will be challenging to calculate, and 215 
precautionary approaches make sense. But as plea bargaining may provide cheaper options for farmers 216 
considering the calculus of theft, we urge water managers to take the factors outlined in the conceptual 217 
framework—including discount rates—into consideration when negotiating. In Australia and Spain 218 
civil penalties are legislated and then irregularly reviewed or increased in line with inflation. And courts 219 
often discount maximum penalties creating gaps between actual sanctions and community expectations 220 
26. Or, as seen, authorities step in to pay the penalties for farmers. At present, Australia cannot set civil 221 
penalties based on multiples of the benefit gained. However, once again ASIC has suggested that either 222 
i) disgorgement of the profits obtained from illegal activity could be applied on top of an existing 223 
sanction, and/or ii) a multiple of up to three times the benefit gained should be possible in practice 224 
(ibid.). 225 
Additional issues 226 
Consistent with earlier research, the case studies clearly support the importance of well-resourced 227 
(financial and human) enforcement and compliance monitoring especially in the remoter parts of 228 
delivery systems, to increase the probability of detection and prosecution as a significant driver of theft 229 
reduction. If insufficiently resourced, current water charges could be increased to ensure adequate 230 
funding, although such moves would likely be unpopular with struggling rural communities and urban 231 
areas sensitive to the challenges of farming. An alternative may be to rely on private water users 232 
protecting their assets and reporting instances of theft, as raised in these cases where neighbors were 233 
red-flagged by one-another. A proviso to this is that individual agents must not be allowed to take 234 
enforcement into their hands. Additional governance options may arise under legal reclassifications of 235 
rivers as individuals 27 which creates responsible agents to act on a rivers’ behalf. However, in cases 236 
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involving the illegal extraction of environmental water, it is most important to consider the possibility 237 
of future collusion to gain upstream and downstream private benefits at the expense of environmental 238 
rights—particularly during dry periods and in areas where environmental water is generally viewed as 239 
usurping the rights of consumptive users. This could undermine the reliability of self-policing. Thus, in 240 
many instances public resourcing may provide a reliable solution to water theft monitoring and 241 
compliance, but we would be interested to see how this emerged from other studies or models. 242 
One consequence of increased surface water monitoring and compliance could be an increase in 243 
groundwater utilisation as a complimentary supply source 14, where available; although access to 244 
groundwater may also diminish incentives to steal 20. Outside areas that rely wholly on groundwater, if 245 
surface water utilization is affected by pumping and/or increased restriction to legal/illegal use 246 
groundwater becomes a more valuable product since it may not be, or may not be perceived as, subject 247 
to similar restrictions. This would place groundwater resources and any associated rights or markets 248 
under stress (if not already), particularly where resourcing associated with bore monitoring and 249 
compliance checks were reduced. In the above cases, where we remain uncertain about whether current 250 
levels of environmental rights can provide national benefits, we can be certain that any infringement 251 
upon those rights via lawful/unlawful extraction will make the systems unsustainable. Once again, this 252 
highlights the importance of closing existing legal options to extract environmental flows, and effective 253 
compliance monitoring and assessment across the full spectrum of water resources as the first steps to 254 
effective deterrents to water theft. Finally, we quickly note the absence in all cases of ‘understanding 255 
change’, which is deeply worrying. This can be addressed, as discussed in the Methods section, via state 256 
contingent approaches to setting probability values, and must be more readily incorporated into water 257 
management and planning to achieve effective sharing and disincentives for water theft in future. 258 
References 259 
1 INTERPOL-UNEP. Strategic Report: Environment, Peace and Security – A Convergence of 260 
Threats. (Geneva, 2016). 261 
2 Felbab-Brown, V. Water theft and water smuggling: Growing problem or tempest in a teapot? 262 
, (Brookings Institute, Washington DC, 2017). 263 
3 Kohlberg, L. Essays on moral development: The psychology of moral development (Vol. 2). 264 
(Harper & Row, 1984). 265 
4 Akers, R. L. Deviant behavior: A social learning approach. (Wadsworth, 1973). 266 
5 Tyler, T. R. Why People Obey the Law: Procedural Justice. (Yale University Press, 1990). 267 
12 
6 Becker, G. S. Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy 268 
76, 169-217 (1968). 269 
7 Vandermeer, C. Water thievery in a rice irrigation system in Taiwan. Annals of the 270 
Association of American Geographers 61, 156-179, doi:10.1111/j.1467-8306.1971.tb00771.x 271 
(1971). 272 
8 Weissing, F. & Ostrom, E. in Game Equilibrium Models  (ed R. Selten) (Springer, 1991). 273 
9 Holley, C. & Sinclair, D. A New Water Policy Option for Australia? Collaborative Water 274 
Governance, Compliance and Enforcement and Audited Self-Management. Australasian 275 
Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 17 (2014). 276 
10 RECCEE. European Report on Water Crimes. (Regional Environmental Center for Central 277 
and Eastern Europe, Torino, Italy, 2017). 278 
11 Wade, R. Managing a drought with canal irrigation: A South Indian case. Agricultural 279 
Administration 17, 177-202 (1984). 280 
12 Trawick, P. B. Successfully governing the commons: Principles of social organization in an 281 
Andean irrigation system. Human Ecology 29, 1-25 (2001). 282 
13 Castilla-Rho, J. C., Rojas, R., Andersen, M. S., Holley, C. & Mariethoz, G. Social tipping 283 
points in global groundwater management. Nature human behaviour 1, 640-649 (2017). 284 
14 Castilla-Rho, J., Rojas, R., Andersen, M., Holley, C. & Mariethoz, G. Sustainable 285 
groundwater management: How long and what will it take? Global Environmental Change 286 
58, 101972 (2019). 287 
15 Wade, R. The management of common property resources: Finding a cooperative solution. 288 
The World Bank Observer 2, 219-234 (1987). 289 
16 De Stefano, L. & Lopez-Gunn, E. Unauthorized groundwater use: institutional, social and 290 
ethical considerations. Water Policy 14, 147-160 (2012). 291 
17 Greiner, R., Fernandes, L., McCartney, F. & Durante, J. Reasons why some irrigation water 292 
users fail to comply with water use regulations: A case study from Queensland, Australia. 293 
Land Use Policy 51, 26-40, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.10.019 (2016). 294 
18 Keane, A., Jones, J. P. G., Edwards-Jones, G. & Milner-Gulland, E. J. The sleeping 295 
policeman: understanding issues of enforcement and compliance in conservation. Animal 296 
Conservation 11, 75-82, doi:10.1111/j.1469-1795.2008.00170.x (2008). 297 
19 Laffont, J.-J. The new economics of regulation ten years after. Econometrica 62, 507-507 298 
(1994). 299 
20 Ray, I. & Williams, J. Locational asymmetry and the potential for cooperation on a canal. 300 
Journal of Development Economics 67, 129-155 (2002). 301 
21 Adamson, D., Loch, A. & Schwabe, K. Adaptation responses to increasing drought 302 
frequency. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 61, 385-403 (2017). 303 
22 Steinfeld, A. Cannabis and water regulation: Sorting through the weeds. The Water Report, 1-304 
11 (2019). 305 
23 DeBoe, G. & Jouanjean, M.-A. in Joint Working Party on Agriculture and the Environment  306 
(OECD, OECD Conference Centre Paris, France, 2018). 307 
24 Ostrom, E. Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. 308 
(Cambridge University Press, 1990). 309 
25 Galdón, C., Jara, Y., Leralta, J. M. & Vived, A. La tierra protegida: La Junta de Andalucía 310 
otorgó subvenciones europeas a fincas en zona protegida de Doñana. (Universidad Rey Juan 311 
Carlos and Unidad Editorial, Madrid, Spain, 2017). 312 
26 The Senate. Criminal, civil and administrative penalties for white collar crime: Final Report. 313 
(Senate Standing Committees on Economics, Canberra, ACT, 2018). 314 
27 O'Donnell, E. & Talbot-Jones, J. Creating legal rights for rivers: lessons from Australia, New 315 
Zealand, and India. Ecology and Society 23, doi:https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-09854-230107 316 
(2018). 317 
28 Meehan, K. Disciplining de facto development: water theft and hydrosocial order in Tijuana. 318 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 31, 319-336 (2013). 319 
29 Eckstein, H. in Case study method: Key issues, key texts  (eds Roger Gomm, Martyn 320 
Hammersley, & Peter Foster) Ch. 6, 119-164 (SAGE Publications, 2000). 321 
30 Noor, K. B. M. Case study: A strategic research methodology. American journal of applied 322 
sciences 5, 1602-1604 (2008). 323 
13 
31 Gomm, R., Hammersley, M. & Foster, P. Case study method: Key issues, key texts. (Sage, 324 
2000). 325 
32 Khan, S. & VanWynsberghe, R. Cultivating the under-mined: Cross-case analysis as 326 
knowledge mobilization. Qualitative social research 9, Article 34 (2008). 327 
33 Baland, J.-M. & Platteau, J.-P. Halting degradation of natural resources: is there a role for 328 
rural communities? , (Food & Agriculture Org., 1996). 329 
34 Ragin, C. C. Introduction to qualitative comparative analysis. The comparative political 330 
economy of the welfare state 299, 300-309 (1994). 331 
35 Marx, A., Rihoux, B. & Ragin, C. The origins, development, and application of Qualitative 332 
Comparative Analysis: the first 25 years. European Political Science Review 6, 115-142 333 
(2014). 334 
36 Velasquez, M. & Hester, P. An Analysis of Multi-Criteria Decision Making Methods. 335 
International Journal of Operations Research 10, 56-66 (2103). 336 
37 Panthi, K. & Bhattarai, S. in First International Conference on Construction in Developing 337 
Countries (ICCIDC–I). 4-5. 338 
38 Hasson, F., Keeney, S. & McKenna, H. Research guidelines for the Delphi survey technique. 339 
Journal of advanced nursing 32, 1008-1015 (2000). 340 
39 Strand, J., Carson, R. T., Navrud, S., Ortiz-Bobea, A. & Vincent, J. A “Delphi Exercise” as a 341 
Tool in Amazon Rainforest Valuation. (The World Bank, 2014). 342 
40 Hajkowicz, S. & Collins, K. A review of multiple criteria analysis for water resource planning 343 
and management. Water resources management 21, 1553-1566 (2007). 344 
41 Uphoff, N. & Wijayaratna, C. M. Demonstrated benefits fro social capital: The productivity 345 
of farmer organizations in Gal Oya, Sri Lanka. World Development 28, 1875-1890 (2000). 346 
42 Adamson, D., Mallawaarachchi, T. & Quiggin, J. Water use and salinity in the Murray-347 
Darling Basin: A state-contingent model. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource 348 
Economics 51, 263-281 (2007). 349 
43 Chambers, R. & Quiggin, J. Uncertainty, production, choice and agency: The state contingent 350 
approach. (Cambridge University Press, 2000). 351 
44 Götze, U., Northcott, D. & Schuster, P. Investment appraisal. Methods and Models, Berlin, 352 
Heidelberg 2008 (2008). 353 
354 
Methods 355 
Case study data and analytical approach 356 
An issue with any analysis of water theft will invariably be identifying and sourcing data 28, especially 357 
with regard to water theft by the agricultural sector. To address this data deficiency we could turn to 358 
stylized figures but this may be easily dismissed by others as unrealistic or groundless in fact. Therefore, 359 
we apply case study analysis as a means of capturing and testing the international regulatory context. 360 
Case studies are valuable at the stage where candidate theory (as proposed here) are to be tested via 361 
history and illustration, leading to interpretation over generalization 29. This due to the fact that a 362 
common issues with the case study methodology can be a lack of general information 30. To address 363 
this, we follow a technique of cross-case analysis which generates more general lessons to increase their 364 
applicability. Two analytical techniques including method of agreement to identify common 365 
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phenomenon in different contexts, and method of difference which identifies the absence of phenomena 366 
across contexts keeping most circumstance similar 31 were used to compare the cases to see reasons of 367 
variable outcomes from the different cases 32. We therefore collect and examine three case studies from 368 
developed economies: i) northern California where highly valuable legalized marijuana production 369 
requires large volumes of water to produce, motivating some growers to steal urban and rural water 370 
under a low probability of detection; ii) the Doñana marshlands in southern Spain which is the most 371 
important site in Europe for migratory birds protected by international conservation agreements 372 
including the World Heritage Convention, and which is under threat due to the illegal expansion of 373 
water intensive and highly profitable strawberry production that is being successfully detected but with 374 
less successfully prosecutions and convictions; and iii) the Barwon-Darling River system in central 375 
Australia that has experienced several alleged, ongoing and proven cases of non-compliance with water 376 
laws in recent years (including allegations of water theft by a large-scale agricultural water user, some 377 
of which involve environmental water), highlighting the need for greater detection and compliance 378 
monitoring. Recently, some of the farmers involved in illegal theft have been successfully convicted 379 
and penalised. The full case studies can be accessed in the Supplementary Material. Common findings 380 
raise a number of points with respect to reducing water theft in the global context, and highlight a need 381 
to build upon the equation provided by Becker 6 via an incorporation of individual and institutional 382 
incentives to fully appreciate the relevance of detection and enforcement probability in the calculus of 383 
compliance. This can be achieved as follows. 384 
Linking the framework to the calculus of compliance 385 
To link to framework directly to the calculus of compliance equation a model (available as part of the 386 
supplementary materials) was developed by the research team. The model involves institutional scores, 387 
weightings and probability values used to inform the calculus of compliance equation in the framework. 388 
The value of the model lies in two forms. First, where probabilities are known (see Box 1), the model 389 
can be used to capture key institutional or natural driver scores, help identify causality between context, 390 
drivers and probabilities (see Figure 1), and clearly point out any implications for management 391 
arrangements. Second, where probabilities are not known (and institutional scores cannot be readily 392 
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obtained), our framework provides the basis for identifying institutional relevance, and the model 393 
provides a structure for organising data and sensitivity testing the probabilities/weights delivered via 394 
appropriate methods (with suggested approaches provided below). Both model applications can be used 395 
to inform water managers on how to address theft problems. The main purpose of the model is to 396 
calculate penalty effectiveness in real terms as a signal to water managers regarding the effectiveness 397 
of current arrangements. 398 
The Doñana as a model example 399 
From our case study, we know that there were 2000 theft cases from 2003, of which 135 prosecuted 400 
(prosecution rate 2.5%) and 50 convicted (conviction rate 37.04%). While these figures may not be 401 
100% accurate they are arguably more reliable estimators than anything produced through expert 402 
judgement/QCA/etc. In such an example, using the model to identify probabilities (the second case 403 
above) will be redundant. Instead, the challenge is that of understanding the connection between drivers 404 
and probabilities so to make theft less appealing. This application of the model is important if we expect 405 
that case studies like the Doñana—where water theft can be easily identified—will become the norm in 406 
future. In this regards, earth observations and remote sensing will play a critical role. For example, 407 
FAO’s pilot WaPOR approach informs managers about real time water consumption and biomass 408 
production. Provided the water rights are known (e.g. via a census), theft becomes straightforward to 409 
detect. This makes it easy to put numbers on the probability of detection, where the model can be used 410 
to calculate the causality implications. 411 
 412 
As a first step, institutional scores (i.e., values strictly of one) must be derived for the full set of designed 413 
context institutional arrangements for successful governance outcomes 24,33 using our framework as a 414 
basis. Institutional scores (where not already known) can be identified using appropriate methods such 415 
as qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) which bridges qualitative and quantitative data through a 416 
capacity to identify cross-case, or within case, study patterns within a 0/1 scoring range 34. QCA enables 417 
assessment of context-specific causality including conditions that might have positive or negative 418 
effects depending on the context 35. Alternative approaches for scoring institutions include multi-criteria 419 
decision-making methods (MCDM) 36 which can be used to transform qualitative assessments into 420 
unbiased quantitative measures 37, or expert opinion captured e.g. through the Delphi Technique (DT)38 421 
which allows qualitative expert opinion to be elicited over time toward a common set of quantitative 422 
scores or values 39. Importantly, any quantitative scores/weights will only occur via thorough qualitative 423 
analysis following the framework as provided. 424 
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Regardless how the scores are assessed, once identified they can be added as values of 1 into the “(A) 425 
Institutions” cells of the model. These scores essentially identify how successful an institution is in their 426 
role. The second step involves weighting each of the design context institutions with respect to their 427 
relevance on detection, prosecution and conviction outcomes in the relevant context. A weighting 428 
approach allocates responsibility for certain actions. Again, this may be achieved using the methods 429 
stipulated above, as an independent exercise with relevant experts, or by the research team if so 430 
qualified. Weightings can be an issue, especially with respect to the complexities associated with water 431 
management 40, and must be treated with caution. 432 
In this instance we use an example set of weights to illustrate the real penalty setting challenges. These 433 
are shown in the “(B) Weightings” cells of the model. Ultimately, the institution score and weighting 434 
values feed into the “(C) Calculus Equation” section of the model. The equation uses both the institution 435 
scores and weighting values to generate probability values for each of the relevant design contexts. The 436 
final step is to enter a penalty value, based on current laws. Additionally, by altering this value a 437 
sensitivity test for various options regulators or water managers may contemplate can occur. The 438 
principal focus, however, is on identifying how effective that penalty rate may be in light of the 439 
calculated probability values. The following examples (as shown in the model, and Table 1 below) help 440 
illustrate the point. A matrix of probability values for each design context category, which can be 441 
modified for individual contexts, are listed for each of the detection, prosecution and conviction 442 
components of the calculus equation. The probabilities listed in Table 1 relate to a model run scenario 443 
we term Total ProbabilityI. A subsequent model run scenario (Total ProbabilityII) is generated by 444 
altering one or more of the institution scores; in this case, a shift in the governance arrangements aimed 445 
at improving monitoring and detection rates. For three modeled penalty rates (i.e., AU$3000, 446 
AU$20000 and AU$50000) the real penalty values are calculated using the respective probability 447 
scenarios. 448 
To example a sensitivity test, an institutional shift from strongly absent to weakly present governance 449 
arrangements—consistent with other works that explore the value of cooperation or investments in 450 
social capital to affect system performance and efficiency 41—is sufficient to change the probability of 451 
detection from 9% to 57%, with a 12% increase in prosecution. There is no change in the conviction 452 
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probability, as we should expect, given no capacity by water managers to affect conviction processes 453 
or probabilities. Note though the relative increase in real penalty values—a roughly 7.5 multiplier effect 454 
in real terms—yet in each case still far less than half the prescribed penalty value for an offence. In this 455 
example, different model runs can be used to identify the relative importance of combining strongly 456 
present legal, water governance and social institutions to bring real penalty values into line with the 457 
prescribed rates. 458 
Table 1: Illustrative example of linked framework to calculus 459 
Design Context Detection Prosecution Conviction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Political 0.04 0.04 0.00    
Legal 0.00 0.65 0.50    
Governance 0.00 0.00 0.00    
Economic 0.04 0.00 0.00    
Social 0.01 0.01 0.08    
Cultural 0.00 0.00 0.02    
       
Prescribed penalty for offence (AU$)  $3,000 $20,000 $50,000 
Total Probability I 9% 70% 60%    
Total Probability II 57% 82% 60%    
Real penaltyI:   $113 $756 $1,890 
Real penaltyII:   $841 $5,608 $14,022 
 460 
It is also possible to deal with contextual complexities via this approach, where different institutional 461 
design scores and weightings can be assigned to varied parts of a system (e.g., upstream versus 462 
downstream sections, local versus central authority management schemes, formal versus informal 463 
arrangements). This enables comparative assessments between those different contextual elements to 464 
identify key requirements for change or investment to achieve optimal outcomes, which have been 465 
previously assessed using symmetrical 8 and asymmetrical games to determine equilibrium rates of 466 
stealing and monitoring. On that front, we believe that our approach could be used in future to optimize 467 
institutional conditions or choices to address a range of issues, not just water theft. 468 
If this coupled framework/modelling approach was applied with the help of institutions in a workshop 469 
setting, it may help bring to light synergies and gaps within processes (i.e. carefully describe roles) but 470 
subsequently lead to a revision of institutional effectiveness. Thus, similar to robust decision-making, 471 
our framework does not make decisions for water managers, but guides a decision-making process. 472 
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State contingent analysis and understanding change 473 
One of the issues identified in the case study comparisons using the framework was a common absence 474 
of water managers to understand change and its consequences for theft. One approach for dealing with 475 
that issue, similar to the approaches discussed above, is state contingent analysis (SCA) 42,43. 476 
Assessment frameworks capable of dealing with uncertainty broadly fall into two branches: models 477 
where the probabilities of future states are unknown by the decision-maker although possible states are 478 
recognized, and models where decision-makers are aware of both the states and their relevant 479 
occurrence probabilities can be derived from available data 44. In the SCA approach, nature (Ω) defines 480 
the state space that can be divided into a series of states of nature (𝑠) to define real and mutually-481 
exclusive sets (S) describing uncertainty (Ω = {1, 2, … , 𝑠, … , 𝑆}). Similar to the design context 482 
categories, SCA probability values can be used to frame natural context categories in the framework 483 
via probabilities of occurrence (e.g., wet, normal and dry states of nature for water supply outcomes). 484 
Importantly the decision-maker has no ability to influence which 𝑠 occurs; s is determined exogenously. 485 
Further, the decision-maker’s subjective belief about the frequency (𝝅) of each 𝑠 occurring is a 486 
probability vector described by (𝝅 = 𝜋1, … , 𝜋𝑠). Critically for our assessment, this combination of 487 
completely describing uncertainty and the contingent outcomes limits the positive/negative impact of 488 
uncertainty. 489 
We can express this another way. When parameterising risk and uncertainty any future water supply 490 
outcome can only be either greater than, or less than, the chosen parameter, which fits nicely into our 491 
requirements to achieve either ‘mostly in’ or ‘mostly out’ results in the scoring approach. However, in 492 
this case due to the absence of understanding change framework issues, we have not sought to identify 493 
probability estimates to represent that concept and its relevance to the calculus of compliance. Future 494 
work involving cases where uncertainty is recognised or dominant in the context will form the basis for 495 
extensions of the framework into this area by the research team. 496 
Finally, with respect to Figure 2 and in line with SCA, it may be necessary to provide some additional 497 
theory to inform the framework application. In the case of agricultural uses/users of water, annual 498 
supply characteristics may incentivize theft and complicate the design of effective regulatory 499 
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mechanisms 21, particularly where low supply conditions continue for several years (Figure 4 below). 500 
Incentives to steal water may be present during wet and normal supply conditions, with lower 501 
probability. However, in dry conditions a perennial (e.g. almond) producers’ choice-set comprises four 502 
options which escalate if constrained supply persists, heightening the probability of theft. In an initial 503 
dry year, perennial producers may pay well-above market prices (SRChoke) to secure water (Option a). 504 
In a second dry year SRChoke investments may be unsustainable and shift to long-run choke (LRChoke) 505 
prices to secure water (Option b). 506 
 507 
Figure 4: Perennial crop legal/illegal behaviour decision context in response to low water supply 21 508 
Should dry conditions persist (e.g. >3 years) perennial producers may be forced back to market prices 509 
with a focus on securing sufficient water to maintain root stocks (Option c). A corner solution emerges 510 
at zero water supply, resulting in rootstock, farm infrastructure, and entrepreneurial capital loss (Option 511 
d). This is a worst-case scenario that producers will seek to avoid, and may consider illegal extraction 512 
in response—or pre-emptively where on-farm infrastructure permits water storage for use during 513 
subsequent periods of scarcity. Similar motivations for water theft may apply equally to annual crop 514 
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